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Abstract
This paper analyzes the trade of information between a data buyer and a data seller.
The data buyer faces a decision problem under uncertainty and seeks to augment his
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optimally o¤ers a menu of (Blackwell) experiments as statistical tests to the data buyer.
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Introduction

The mechanisms by which information is traded help shape the creation and the distribution
of surplus in many important markets. Information about individual borrowers guides banks’
lending decisions, information about consumers’ characteristics facilitates targeted online
advertising, and information about a patient’s genome enhances health care delivery. In
all these settings, information buyers (i.e., lenders, advertisers, and health care providers)
have private knowledge relevant to their decision problem at the time of contracting (e.g.,
independent or informal knowledge of a borrower, prior interactions with speci…c consumers,
access to a patient’s family history). Thus, potential data buyers seek to acquire supplemental
information to improve the quality of their decision-making.
In this paper, we develop a canonical framework to analyze the sale of supplemental
information. We consider a data buyer who faces a decision problem under uncertainty.
A monopolist data seller owns a database containing information about a “state” variable
relevant to the buyer’s decision. Initially, the data buyer has private and partial information
about the state. The precision of this private information a¤ects the buyer’s willingness to
pay for any supplemental information. Thus, from the point of view of the data seller, there
are many possible types of the data buyer. We investigate the revenue-maximizing policy
for the data seller in terms of how much information the seller should provide and how the
seller should price access to her data.
In order to screen the heterogeneous types of the data buyer, the seller o¤ers a menu of
products. In our context, these products are Blackwell experiments, i.e., signals that reveal
information about the buyer’s payo¤-relevant state. Only the information product itself is
assumed to be contractible. By contrast, payments cannot be made contingent on either the
buyer’s action or the realized state and signal. Consequently, the value of an experiment for
a given buyer can be computed independently of its price. Finally, even though the buyer
is partially informed by his initial private beliefs, the analysis di¤ers considerably from a
belief-elicitation problem. Instead, we cast the problem into a nonlinear pricing framework
where the buyer’s type is determined by his prior belief. The seller’s problem then reduces
to designing and pricing information products in di¤erent versions.
The design of information can be phrased in terms of a hypothesis test. Indeed, the entire
analysis can be viewed as a pricing model for statistical tests. For concreteness, consider
a medical expert (the “data buyer”) who seeks to distinguish a null hypothesis H0 from a
mutually exclusive alternative hypothesis H1 . The medical expert is a Bayesian decision
maker with a prior distribution over the true hypothesis. The expert can take one of two
actions, and each one is optimal under the respective hypothesis.
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Figure 1: Conditional Distributions of the Test Statistic
The genetic testing company (the “data seller”) has access to a test statistic that is
distributed conditional on the true state of the world, H0 or H1 , as in Figure 1. We study
how the data seller should reveal (possibly partial) information about the test statistic and
how she should price this information. For instance, the seller can reveal the exact value of
the test statistic to the buyer. The buyer then chooses the action corresponding to H1 if
the test statistic is above a certain threshold. This information structure induces type-I and
type-II errors ( ; ) as in Figure 1. It also improves the buyer’s payo¤ relative to acting on
his prior information only. The novel aspect in our analysis is that the seller does not know
the buyer’s prior beliefs and, hence, the buyer’s willingness to pay for this information. She
therefore must employ a richer mechanism to screen the heterogeneous buyers.
Among other options, the seller can o¤er the buyer a menu of binary (“Pass/Fail”) tests.
Each test reports the outcome “Pass”when, say, the actual test statistic is below a di¤erent
threshold and leads the buyer to take the optimal action under H0 . Each one of these tests
yields a di¤erent combination of type-I and type-II errors ( ; ). Given the information
available to the seller in Figure 1, the set of feasible statistical tests is described by the area
between the red line and the blue curve in the left panel of Figure 2.

Figure 2: Feasible Information Structures
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In this paper, we study a canonical version of this problem. We assume that providing
information (e.g., running tests) is costless and that all information structures are available
to the seller. In the right panel of Figure 2, this is illustrated by the horizontal and vertical
lines which describe statistical tests that minimize one type of error while holding …xed the
other type of error at a given level. We then characterize the revenue-maximizing menu of
experiments, i.e., statistical tests.
The very nature of information products enriches the scope of price discrimination and
leads to new insights relative to the classic nonlinear pricing problem of Mussa and Rosen
(1978) and Maskin and Riley (1984). Because information is valuable only if it a¤ects the
decision maker’s action, buyers with heterogeneous beliefs do not simply value informative
signals di¤erently— they disagree on their ranking. In this sense, the value of information
naturally has both a vertical quality element and a horizontal positioning element akin to
the trade-o¤ between type-I and type-II errors in Figure 2. The data seller can therefore
pro…tably exploit the incompleteness of Blackwell’s order and design a menu of information
structures that appeal to di¤erent buyer types.
As expected, the optimal menu contains, in general, both the fully informative experiment and partially informative, “distorted” experiments. However, the distorted information products are not simply noisy versions of the same data. Instead, optimality imposes
considerable structure on the distortions in the information provided. In particular, every
experiment o¤ered as part of the optimal menu is non-dispersed, i.e., the seller induces each
buyer to take the correct action in at least one state with probability one. In other words,
with two states and actions, the seller induces some buyers to make either type-I or type-II
errors, but not both.
We …rst provide a full characterization of the optimal menu for the case of two types.
We rank the types according to the probability that they make the correct decision in the
absence of additional information. Indeed, the seller can provide a larger incremental value
to a buyer with a smaller probability of making the correct decision. Thus, the “high”type
is the ex ante less informed type, while the “low”type is the ex ante more informed type.
In the optimal mechanism, the high type purchases the fully informative experiment,
while the low type buys a distorted experiment. The seller’s screening problem is facilitated
by the possibility of providing “directional”information: the optimally distorted experiment
introduces a type-II error in a subset of signals that the low type considers relatively less
likely than the high type, allowing the seller to optimally reduce the information rents of
the less-informed type without the need to exclude the more-informed type. As a result,
discriminatory pricing can be pro…table even if all buyer types have congruent prior beliefs,
i.e., they would take identical actions in the absence of new information.
4

Then, we restrict attention to binary states and actions but allow more than two types.
This setting yields sharper insights into the pro…tability of discriminatory pricing for selling
information. In the binary-state environment, the buyer’s types are one dimensional and
the utilities linear. An intuition analogous to the monopoly pricing problems of Myerson
(1981) and Riley and Zeckhauser (1983) suggests that the seller should simply post a price
for the fully informative experiment. Instead, we show that the seller’s problem consists of
screening both within and across the two subsets of buyer types with congruent priors.
If the seller could perfectly discriminate across groups, the intuition from linear monopoly
problems would apply, and the optimal menu would involve two (generically di¤erent) posted
prices for the fully informative experiment. Flat pricing of the complete information structure
is still optimal under strong regularity conditions on the distribution of types. More generally,
the optimal menu for a continuum of types contains at most two experiments: one is fully
informative, and the other contains two signals, one of which perfectly reveals the true
state. In particular, the optimal menu involves discriminatory pricing (i.e., two di¤erent
experiments) when “ironing”is required (Myerson, 1981). Intuitively, the second experiment
intends to serve buyers in one group, while charging higher prices to the other group.
Our …ndings have concrete implications for the sale of information. In Section 6, we
illustrate our results in the context of the markets discussed above, i.e., medical and genetic
testing, credit reports, and targeted advertising.
Our paper joins the literature on selling information and monopolistic screening. A
large body of literature studies the problem of versioning goods, emphasizing how digital
production allows sellers to easily customize (or degrade) the attributes of such products
(Shapiro and Varian, 1999). This argument applies even more forcefully to information
products (i.e., experiments) and suggests that versioning should be an attractive pricediscrimination technique (Sarvary, 2012). In this paper, we investigate the validity of these
claims in a simple contracting environment à la Mussa and Rosen (1978).
Admati and P‡eiderer (1986, 1990) provide the classic treatment of selling information to
a continuum of agents with ex-ante identical information who trade in a rational expectations
equilibrium. They show that the provision of noisy and hence heterogeneous information
turns traders into local monopolists over their idiosyncratic signals, thus preserving the value
of acquiring information even in the presence of competition. In contrast, our paper focuses
on ex ante heterogeneous buyer whose value of information di¤ers due their di¤erent prior
beliefs. Consequently, the data seller in our setting o¤ers noisy versions of the data to screen
the buyer’s initial information and to extract more surplus, leading to profound di¤erences
in the optimal information structures.
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Es½o and Szentes (2007b) and Hörner and Skrzypacz (2015) make more recent contributions to the problem of selling information, focusing on speci…c, distinct aspects of the
problem (i.e., bundling products and information or dynamic information disclosure) in very
di¤erent contracting environments.
Within the mechanism design literature, our approach is related to, yet conceptually
distinct from, models of discriminatory information disclosure in which the seller of a good
both discloses horizontal match-value information and sets a price. Several papers, including
Ottaviani and Prat (2001), Johnson and Myatt (2006), Bergemann and Pesendorfer (2007),
Es½o and Szentes (2007a), Krähmer and Strausz (2015), and Li and Shi (2015), analyze this
problem from an ex ante perspective, where the seller commits (simultaneously or sequentially) to a disclosure rule and to a pricing policy.1 In related contributions, Lizzeri (1999)
considers vertical information acquisition and disclosure by a monopoly intermediary, and
Abraham, Athey, Babaio¤, and Grubb (2014) study vertical information disclosure in auctions. In a setting similar to ours, Babaio¤, Kleinberg, and Paes Leme (2012) derive the
optimal dynamic mechanism for selling information sequentially.
Commitment to a disclosure policy is also present in the literature on Bayesian persuasion,
e.g., Rayo and Segal (2010), Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011), and Kolotilin, Li, Mylovanov,
and Zapechelnyuk (2015). In contrast to this line of work, our model admits monetary
transfers and rules out any direct e¤ect of the buyer’s ex post action on the seller’s utility.

2

Model

A single decision maker faces a decision problem under uncertainty. The state of nature !
is drawn from a …nite set : The decision maker must choose an action a from a …nite set
A: We assume without loss of generality that the sets of actions and states have the same
cardinality jAj = j j = N:
Payo¤s The ex post utility function of the decision maker is denoted by u (a; !). We
specialize the utility function by assuming that the decision maker seeks to match the state
and the action. His ex post utility function u (a; !) is therefore given by
u (a; !) = 1[a=!] :

(1)

This formulation assumes that the decision maker assigns uniform gains and losses across
states. More general formulations are equally tractable but complicate the exposition.
1

In addition, a number of more recent papers, among which Balestrieri and Izmalkov (2014), Celik (2014),
Koessler and Skreta (2014), and Mylovanov and Tröger (2014) analyze this question from an informed
principal perspective.
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Prior Information The type of the decision maker, 2 =
; consists of his interim
beliefs about the states; these beliefs 2 are private information and can be generated from
a common prior and privately observed signals. In particular, suppose there is a common
prior 2
. The decision maker privately observes an informative signal r 2 R according
to a commonly known information structure
!

:

R:

The decision maker then forms his interim beliefs

2

via Bayes’rule:

(r j !) (!)
:
0
0
! 0 (r j ! ) (! )

(! j r) = P

The interim beliefs (! j r), simply denoted by , are thus the private information of the
decision maker. From the data seller’s point of view, the common prior 2
and the
distribution of signals : ! R induce a distribution of private beliefs of the data buyer,
F 2

,

which we take as a primitive of our model.
Incremental Information The data buyer seeks to augment his initial private information with additional information –or experiments –from the data seller in order to improve
the quality of his decision making. An experiment (or an information structure) I = f ; Sg
consists of a set of signals s 2 S and a likelihood function:
:

!

S:

We assume throughout that the realizations of the buyer’s private signal r 2 R and of the
signal s 2 S from any experiment I are independent, conditional on the state !. In other
words, the buyer and the seller draw their information from independent sources.2
Experiment (or Information Structure) For a given information structure I, we denote by ij the conditional probability of signal sj in state ! i ,
ij

= Pr (sj j ! i ) ;

2

As usual, the model allows for the alternative interpretations of a single buyer and a continuum of buyers.
With a continuum of buyers, we will assume that states ! are identically and independently distributed across
buyers and that di¤erent buyers’signals are conditionally independent.
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where

ij

0 and

P

j

ij

= 1 for all i. We then obtain the stochastic matrix
I

s1

!1
..
.

..
.

sj

11

!i
..
.

1j

..

1J

.

(2)

i1

ij

..
.

!N

sJ

..

.

N1

NJ

The following experiments are of particular interest:
1. the fully informative experiment with

ii

= 1 for all i and jN j = jJj;

2. a non-dispersed experiment that contains a unit row vector,

ii

= 1 for some i;

3. a noise-free experiment that contains a column sj with only one positive entry,
for some j.

jj

>0

A non-dispersed experiment conveys the information about some state i with a single
signal si . Conversely, any signal other than si rules out the state ! i . A noise-free experiment
reveals some state ! i without noise, i.e., the posterior belief after observing si is concentrated
at ! i . The fully informative experiment is non-dispersed and noise-free everywhere.
An information policy or simply a menu M = fI; tg consists of a collection of information
structures and an associated tari¤ function, i.e.,
t : I ! R+ :

I = fIg ;

Our goal is to characterize the revenue-maximizing menu for the seller.
We deliberately focus on the pure problem of designing and selling information structures.
We therefore assume that the seller commits to a menu before the realization of the state !
and the type , and that neither the buyer’s action a, the realized state ! nor the signal s are
contractible. Thus, while the data buyer holds private information, scoring rules and other
belief-elicitation schemes are not available to the seller to the extent that the conditioning
event is not veri…able. The timing of the game is as follows:
1. the seller posts a menu M;
2. the true state ! and the buyer’s type

are realized;

3. the buyer chooses an experiment I 2 I and pays the corresponding price t;
4. the buyer observes a signal s from the experiment I and chooses an action a.
8

The data seller is unconstrained in her choice of information structures (e.g., the seller
can improve upon the buyer’s original information with arbitrarily accurate signals), and
the marginal cost of providing the information is nil. These assumptions capture settings in
which sellers own very precise datasets and distribution costs are negligible.

3

Information Design

We now describe the value of the buyer’s initial information and the incremental value of an
information structure I = f ; Sg. Let i denote the interim probability that type assigns
to state ! i , with i = 1; :::; N . For an arbitrary utility function u (a; !), the value of the
buyer’s problem under prior information is given by
u ( ) , max
a

nXN

o
u
(a;
!
)
:
i
i

i=1

Now, suppose that the buyer has access to an incremental information structure I = f ; Sg
that generates signals : ! S; where the number of signal realizations is jSj = J. The
buyer chooses an action after updating her beliefs, leading to the expected (gross) utility
u ( ; sj ) , max
a

(
XN

i=1

PN

i ij

i=1

)

The marginal distribution of signals sj from the perspective of type
Pr [sj j ] =

XN

i=1

(3)

u (a; ! i ) :

i ij

is given by

i ij :

Integrating over all signal realizations sj and subtracting the value of prior information, the
(net) value of an information structure I for type is given by
V (I; ) , Es [u ( ; s)]

u( ) =

J
X

max

j=1

a

nXN

i=1

u (a; ! i )

i ij

o

u( ):

With the restriction to utility functions that match action to state, as de…ned earlier in (1),
the value of information takes the simpler form:
V (I; ) =

J
X
j=1

max f
i

9

i ij g

max f i g :
i

(4)

The value of the prior information, given by maxi i , is generated by choosing the action
that has the highest prior probability. The value of the information structure is generated
by choosing an action on the basis of the posterior belief i ij induced by every signal sj .
Quite simply, the value of an information structure is given by the incremental probability
of the buyer choosing the correct action given the state.
An information structure I is valuable only if di¤erent signals sj lead to di¤erent actions
ai . In particular, if arg maxi i ij is constant across all the signals sj , then (4) immediately
implies that V (I; ) = 0: Conversely, the fully informative experiment I guarantees that
the buyer takes the correct action in every realization of state ! i . The value of the fully
informative experiment is therefore given by
V (I ; ) = 1

max i :
i

(5)

In Figure 3, we illustrate the value of an information structure in a model with three
states ! i 2 f! 1 ; ! 2 ; ! 3 g. The prior belief of each agent is therefore an element of the
two-dimensional simplex, = ( 1 ; 2 ; 1
1
2 ). We display below the fully informative
experiment I and a partial information experiment I as a function of the buyer’s prior.3

Figure 3: Value of Fully and Partially Informative Experiments, N = 3
Viewed as a function of the types, the value of an experiment V (I; ) is piecewise linear
in with a …nite number of kinks. The linearity of the value function is a consequence of
3

The information structure in the right panel is given by the likelihood matrix:
I
!1
!2
!3

s1
1=2
0
0

s2
1=4
3=4
1=4
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s3
1=4
1=4
3=4

the Bayesian nature of our problem, where types are prior probabilities over states. The
downward kinks are due to the max operator in the buyer’s reservation utility u ( ). They
correspond to changes in the buyer’s action without incremental information. The upward
kinks are generated by the max operator in (3) and re‡ect changes in the buyer’s preferred
action upon observing a signal.
We now characterize the menu of experiments that maximizes the seller’s pro…ts. By
the revelation principle, we may state the seller’s problem as designing a direct mechanism
M = fI ( ) ; t ( )gthat assigns an information structure I denoted by I ( ) to each type of
the buyer at a price t ( ). The seller’s problem consists of maximizing the expected transfers
max

fI( );t( )g

Z

t ( ) dF ( )

(6)

2

subject to incentive-compatibility constraints
V (I ( ) ; )

t( )

V (I ( 0 ) ; )

t ( 0) ;

8 ;

0

2

;

and individual rationality constraints
V (I ( ) ; )

t( )

0;

8 2

:

The seller’s problem can be simpli…ed by reducing the set of optimal information structures: a very tractable class of experiments can generate every outcome (i.e., distribution of
buyer actions and seller pro…ts) attainable with an incentive-compatible menu.
Proposition 1 (Responsive Information Structures)
Every incentive-compatible menu M can be represented as a collection of information structures I ( ) in which every type takes a di¤erent action after observing each signal s 2 S ( ) :
This result follows from the insight of Myerson (1986) for multi-stage games, where signals consist of recommendations over actions. The intuition is straightforward: consider an
incentive-compatible information policy that contains an experiment I ( ) with more signals
than actions; the seller could combine all signals in I( ) that lead to the same choice of
action for type ; clearly, the value of this experiment remains constant for type (who does
not modify his behavior). In addition, because the original signal is strictly less informative
than the new one, V (I( ); 0 ) decreases (weakly) for all 0 6= , relaxing the incentive constraints. We refer to incentive-compatible information structures in which the truthtelling
agent chooses a distinct action for every distinct signal in a responsive information structure.
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An immediate corollary of Proposition 1 is that, without loss of generality, we can restrict
attention to experiment in which the signal space has at most the cardinality of the action
space. This process allows us to write the likelihood function of every information structure,
described earlier in (2), as a square matrix with jJj = jN j
I ( ) s1
!1

si

11

1i

..
!i
..
.
!N

sN
1N

.

:

i1

(7)

ii

..
.

..

.

N1

NN

Moreover, because every signal sent with positive probability under experiment I ( ) leads to
a di¤erent action, we can order signals so that each si 2 S ( ) recommends the corresponding
action ai to type . The resulting value of experiment I ( ) for type can be written as
V (I ( ) ; ) =

N
X

i ii

i=1

max f i g :
i

(8)

Thus, the diagonal entries of the matrix generate the value of the experiment I ( ) for type
. By contrast, the o¤-diagonal entries serve as instruments to guarantee the incentivecompatibility constraints across types.4
We emphasize that the square matrix property does not require that every action ai is
recommended with strictly positive probability. In particular, some signals si may never be
sent, thus corresponding to a column vector of zeros at the i-th position. Finally, the nature
of the value of information imposes additional structural properties on an optimal menu.
Proposition 2 (Non-Dispersed Information)
In any optimal menu of experiments:
1. the fully informative experiment I is part of the menu;
2. every experiment is non-dispersed, i.e.,

ii

= 1 for some i.

The …rst part of this result can be established via contradiction. Every type values
the fully informative experiment I the most among all experiments. Suppose, then, that
I is not part of the menu and denote the most expensive item currently on the menu by I.
4

Given responsive information structures, we can discard the …rst max operator in the value of experiment
I ( ) for any truthtelling type . We still need to use the original formulation (4) when computing type ’s
value of misreporting and buying experiment I 0 .
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The seller can replace experiment I with the complete information structure I , keeping all
other prices constant, and charging a strictly higher price for I than for I. The new menu
increases the revenue of the seller without lowering the net utility of any buyer type.
The second part implies that, for every experiment I, there exists a state ! i that leads
buyer to take the correct action with probability one. In other words, any time the realized
state is ! i , signal si is sent, and the buyer takes action ai . Conversely, the buyer can rule
out the state ! i after observing any other signal sk 6= si . This result can also be established
by an improvement argument. Consider an experiment I and suppose there was no diagonal
entry ii = 1. The seller can pro…tably increase all diagonal elements ii by the same
amount until the …rst diagonal entry reaches 1. Concurrently, the seller can raise the price
of the experiment by the same amount. Since the beliefs of each type over the states sum
to one, the uniform increase in the probability of matching the state is valued uniformly
across all types 2 . Thus, a commensurate increase in the price completely o¤sets the
value of the additional information provided and, hence, leaves all incentive-compatibility
and participation constraints una¤ected.
Having established the general structural properties of the optimal information policy, we
now provide a complete characterization of the optimal menu in two important environments.
In Section 6, we discuss the implications of these properties for the observable characteristics
of real-world information products.

4

Optimal Menu with Binary Types

In this section, we allow for any …nite number N of states and actions but restrict the private
information to consist of two types only. A type is thus a N -dimensional probability vector.
By contrast, in the next section, we restrict the state and action space to be binary but allow
the private information to consist of a continuum of (one-dimensional) private beliefs. These
two settings provide complementary results regarding the nature of the optimal pricing and
design of information. We discuss towards the end of this section the di¢ culties that arise in
generalizing the results beyond two types and two states (and actions) simultaneously. This
will also give us the chance to discuss the current model’s relationship with the multi-item
bundling problem.
We thus consider a setting with N states and actions and two possible buyer types, 2
0 00
f ; g. In the absence of additional information, each type would choose the action that
matches the state that has the highest prior probability in the vector = ( 1 ; :::; i ; :::; N ).
The value of a perfectly informative experiment (5) is therefore larger for the type 2 f 0 ; 00 g
who displays a lower prior probability on the state he deems most likely. This suggests that
13

the data seller can provide the largest value to the type whose largest prior probability
is smallest. Equivalently, the lower of the two types is willing to pay more to resolve the
uncertainty completely. We therefore identify the high type as
H

, arg min max i ;
2f 0 ;

00

g i2N

and the low type as
L

, arg max max i .
2f 0 ;

00

g i2N

We denote the probability that the high type appears in the population by
, Pr( =

H

):

To facilitate the description of the seller’s problem, we establish two familiar properties:
“no distortion at the top,”con…rming the intuition that the least-informed type is the “high
type”who receives an e¢ cient allocation; and “no rent at the bottom,”i.e., for the low type,
which coincides with the ex ante more-informed type.
Proposition 3 (Binding Constraints)
In any optimal menu, type H purchases the fully informative experiment I ; the incentivecompatibility constraint of type H binds; and the participation constraint of type L binds.
With this result in place, the remaining question is what kind of information the low
and ex ante more-informed type receives in the optimal menu and what prices the seller can
charge. It is useful to develop some intuition for the case of two actions and two states.

4.1

Binary Actions and States

For the moment, consider an environment with two actions a 2 fa1 ; a2 g and two states
! 2 f! 1 ; ! 2 g. The buyer type is a two-dimensional vector = ( 1 ; 2 ). However, with minor
abuse of notation, we identify each type simply with the prior probability of the state ! 1 :
, Pr [! = ! 1 ] :
The de…nition of high and low types therefore implies
H

L

1=2

14

1=2 :

(9)

In light of Proposition 1, it is su¢ cient to consider for every type
I ( ) that generate (at most) two signals:
I( )

s1

!1
!2

11

1

information structures

s2

( )
1
22 ( )

11 (
22 (

(10)

) :

)

Without loss of generality, we assume 11 ( ) + 22 ( )
1. In other words, signal s1 is
relatively more likely to occur than signal s2 under state ! 1 than under state ! 2 , or
11

1

1

( )
22 ( )

( )
:
22 ( )
11

As explained in (8) above, the diagonal entries of the matrix generate the probability that
information structure I ( ) allows type to match the realized state ! i with his action ai .
Therefore, we can write type ’s value for an arbitrary information structure I as
V (I; ) = max f

11

+

22

(1

)

maxf ; 1

g; 0g ,

(11)

where the …rst max operator accounts for the possibility that type may not follow the
recommendation of one of the signals and, hence, derive no value from the incremental
information. (For each type and experiment I ( ), Proposition 1 also implies that we can
ignore the max operator.) In Figure 4, we illustrate how the value of information changes as a
function of the type for two di¤erent experiments, namely, the fully informative experiment
I 0 = ( 011 ; 022 ) = (1; 1) and a partially informative experiment I 00 = ( 0011 ; 0022 ) = (1=2; 1).

Figure 4: Value of Fully and Partially Informative Experiments, N = 2
The behavior of the value of information as a function of the buyer’s interim beliefs
re‡ects many properties that we have already formally established. First, the most valuable
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type for the seller is the ex ante least-informed type, namely, = 1=2. Conversely, the
most-informed types 2 f0; 1g have zero value of information. The linear decline in each
direction away from = 1=2 follows from the linearity of the value of information in the
interim probability. Second, when we consider any asymmetric experiment, such as the one
displayed in the right panel of Figure 4, the distance from the least-informed type j
1=2j
is not a su¢ cient statistic for the value of information. The di¤erent slopes on each side
of = 1=2 indicate di¤erent marginal bene…ts for matching state ! 1 versus state ! 2 on the
basis of di¤erences in the interim beliefs .
Thus, even in an environment where types are clearly one dimensional, information products are inherently high-dimensional (in this case, two dimensional). In particular, information always has both a vertical (quality) and a horizontal (positioning) dimension. Unlike in
models of nonlinear pricing (with respect to either quantity or quality) where all the types
agree on the relative ranking of all the products, in the current environment, the types disagree on the ranking of all partial information structures, and agree only on the top ranking
of the complete information structure.
Towards more general results, we o¤er the following distinction: the interim beliefs of the
two types are said to be congruent if both types would choose the same action in the absence
of the additional information. If we adopt the convention that the high type chooses action
H
L
a1 under prior information (i.e., H 1=2), then priors are congruent if 1=2
and
L
H
are noncongruent if
1=2
. In Proposition 4, we complete the characterization of
the optimal menu in the setting with binary states.
Proposition 4 (Partial Information)
1. With congruent priors, the low type receives either zero or complete information.
2. With noncongruent priors, the low type receives either partial or complete information.
Congruent Priors. In the case of congruent priors, the argument is related to the classic
monopoly pricing problem. By Proposition 2, we know that the optimal information structure has to be non-dispersed. With congruent priors, both types would choose action a1
absent any additional information. As we establish formally in Proposition 5, the seller sets
L
) = 1. The issue is therefore how much information to provide about state ! 2 , i.e.,
11 (
I

L

!1
!2

s1

s2

1
1

22 (
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L

)

:
0
L
)
22 (

Any partially informative experiment with 22 ( L ) 2 (0; 1) is also valuable for the high type,
whose incentive constraint in this case reduces to
t

H

t

H
1
1
| {z } |

L

L

22

{z

}

:

additional precision

Pr(! 2 )

Hence, we observe that the utility of the buyer type and both the objective and the constraints in the seller’s problem are linear in the choice variable 22 . We can therefore appeal
to the result of Riley and Zeckhauser (1983) on monopoly pricing that establishes the optimality of an extremal policy. Such a policy consists of either allocating the object (here,
the information) with probability one or not to allocate it all, hence 22 2 f0; 1g. As in
the monopoly pricing problem, which policy is optimal depends on the size of each segment.
Thus, the low type receives the fully informative experiment if the high type is su¢ ciently
infrequent relative to the willingness to pay for the information, or
L

1

H

1

H

1
1

()

L

:

Noncongruent Priors. In the case of noncongruent priors, or L < 1=2 < H , both the
argument and the result are rather distinct from those of the classic monopoly problem.
With noncongruent priors, in the absence of any information, the two types would choose
di¤erent actions. Therefore, each type has a willingness to pay to learn more about the state
that the other type believes to be more likely. Thus, the seller can provide information that
is valuable to one type but has zero value for the other type. For example, suppose that
L
) = 1 and 11 ( L ) is chosen such that, after receiving signal s2 , the high type H places
22 (
equal posterior probability on ! 1 and ! 2 :
H

(1

0
11 )

H

= 1

()

0
11

=

2

H

1
H

2 (0; 1) .

(12)

Type H is thus indi¤erent between action a1 and a2 . Because he would choose action a1
absent any information, the information structure I 0
I0
!1
!2

s1

s2

0
11

0
11

1

0

(13)

1

does not lead to a strict improvement in his decision making (and, hence, his utility). By
contrast, the low type assigns positive value to I 0 since signal s1 would lead type L to match
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his action to state ! 1 , which type L would never have achieved absent any information.
Thus, the seller can o¤er partial information to the low type without incurring any implicit
cost in terms of surplus extraction vis-à-vis the high type.
In fact, since the seller could charge the low type a positive price for the above information
structure I 0 , whereas the high type would assign zero value to it, the incentive constraint
of the high type would not bind. Hence, the seller can o¤er an even more informative
experiment I 00 to the low type until the incentive constraint of the high type eventually
becomes binding. As the partially informative signal I 00 has a positive price tailored to
type L , i.e., t L = L 0011 , the high type can be made indi¤erent between buying the
information structure or not by setting
1| {z H}
t(

H

)

L 00
11

H
= |{z}
| {z }
t(

L

)

Pr(! 1 )

(1
| {z

00
11 )

}

()

00
11

=

2

H

H

1
L

:

(14)

additional precision

Experiment I 00 is as informative as possible while satisfying the high type’s incentive
compatibility constraint and both participation constraints with equality. The argument in
support of a partially informative experiment is illustrated below in Figure 5, which depicts
the value of two experiments net of the price as a function of the buyer’s type 2 [0; 1]. We
consider the case on noncongruent preferences with L = 1=5 < 1=2 < 7=10 = H . Both
types are equally likely.

Figure 5: Suboptimal Menu: (

11 ;

22 )

2 f(1; 1); (4=7; 1)g

The net value of the fully informative experiment I is depicted by the straight line at a
H
price t H = 1
that leaves the type H indi¤erent between buying and not buying the
fully informative experiment. The dashed line depicts the partial information experiment
given by 011 , as described by (12). The associated partial information experiment I 0 leaves
the low type L indi¤erent between buying and not buying. As for the high type H ,
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this experiment o¤ers zero value at a positive price, leaving his incentive constraint slack.
Correspondingly, the net value of the partial information experiment I 0 is strictly below the
net value of the fully informative experiment for the high type.
In fact, the incentive compatibility constraints are slack with this menu of experiments
for both types. Therefore, the seller can increase the quality of the experiment sold to the
low type L while satisfying the incentive constraint for the high type H . The corresponding
experiment I 00 with the associated 0011 as given by (14) is illustrated in Figure 6.

Figure 6: Optimal Menu: (

11 ;

22 )

2 f(1; 1); (4=5; 1)g

This example highlights the “horizontal”aspect of selling information that increases the
scope of screening: the high type H buys the perfectly informative experiment; the low
type L buys a partially informative experiment; and the seller extracts the entire surplus
(which, however, falls short of the socially e¢ cient surplus). In the optimal menu, the partial
informative experiment I 00 is eventually replaced by the fully informative experiment if the
proportion of low types becomes large.
To summarize the results in the binary model, (i) with congruent priors, both types
receive complete information if they are su¢ ciently similar or if the low type is relatively
frequent, while (ii) with noncongruent priors, the optimal menu o¤ers the perfect information
structure to both types if they are su¢ ciently similar in their prior information or if the low
type is su¢ ciently frequent. O¤ering two experiments becomes optimal if the two types
are su¢ ciently di¤erent in their level of informativeness. Importantly, the low type always
receives some information in that case and is not excluded, as we would expect from a
conventional screening model.5 Furthermore, the high type receives positive rents only if he
is pooled with the low type. Otherwise, the seller extracts the entire surplus generated.
5

In Section 4.2, we show that exclusion requires not only that types agree on the most likely state but
also that their relative beliefs about any two other states coincide. This requirement is vacuous with two
states only but non-generic with N > 2.

19

Relationship to Type I/II Errors In a binary action environment, any information
structure can be readily interpreted as a statistical test o¤ered to the buyer. The test may
be subject to type-I and type-II statistical errors.6 In line with the standard notation in
statistics, we denote the probability of type-I and type-II errors as and , respectively. We
can then represent the information structure as a hypothesis test, say for the low type who
has a null hypothesis H0 = f! 2 g,
s1

I
!1 1
!2

s2
1

In the case of noncongruent priors, in view of Proposition 4, the optimal test o¤ered to the
low type has the following structure:
I

s1

!1 1
!2
0

s2
:
1

Proposition 4 thus asserts that the optimal hypothesis test eliminates the type-I error ( = 0)
and allows for some type-II error ( > 0). In fact, the optimal hypothesis test minimizes the
type-II error subject to the incentive compatibility constraint. Conversely, we can ask what
would happen if the high type who has a null hypothesis H0 = f! 1 g (as H > 1=2) were
to misreport his type and attempt to purchase the hypothesis test meant for the low type,
L
< 1=2. Then, he would purchase a hypothesis test with strikingly di¤erent properties,
namely, one that induces no type-II errors but substantial type-I errors. The di¤erence in
the error structure of the test across types supports the separation in the optimal menu.
We now examine the comparative statics of the optimal menu. Because the high type
buys the fully informative experiment and the low type’s experiment always has zero type-I
error, the optimal information structure is determined by the level of type II error.
Corollary 1 (Comparative Statics of Type II Error)
The type II error in the optimal experiment I( L ) is
1. increasing in the frequency

of the high type;

2. increasing in the precision of the prior of the high type
3. decreasing in the precision of the prior of the low type
6

H
L

1=2 ;
1=2 .

A type-I error leads the decision maker to reject the null hypothesis even though it is true. By contrast,
a type-II error leads the decision maker to accept the null hypothesis even though it is false.
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Thus, even though the shape of the optimal menu depends on whether types have congruent or noncongruent priors, the comparative statics of the optimal information structure are
robust across the di¤erent scenarios. The rent extraction vs. e¢ ciency trade-o¤ is resolved
at the expense of the low type whenever (i) the fraction of high types is larger, (ii) the
high type has a higher willingness to pay for information, or (iii) the low type has a lower
willingness to pay for the complete information structure.

4.2

Many States and Actions

With more than two states and actions, the seller’s problem involves all the di¢ culties associated with multidimensional screening. Nevertheless, the structural properties of the optimal
experiments extend to multidimensional settings. We …rst characterize the optimal menu
within a binary type environment and then discuss the issues that arise with an arbitrary
…nite number of types, as well as the relationship with monopoly bundling problems.
We allow for N states and actions but momentarily only two types of buyers,
2
L H
L
;
. We recall that the high-value type satis…es maxi H
i < maxi i and that Proposition 3 reduces the seller’s problem to …nding the low type’s experiment I L and the
two payments tL ; tH . Our approach is to solve a relaxed problem where we require the
high-value type to take action ai upon observing signal si even when buying the low-value
type’s experiment. We then show that the solution to the relaxed problem satis…es the original constraints; hence, it also solves the full problem. Formally, we replace the incentive
compatibility constraint
U

N
X

H

j=1

H
i

max
i

L

ij (

)

max
i

H
i

t(

L

);

with the weaker constraint that
U

H

N
X

H
j

jj (

L

)

j=1

max
i

H
i

t(

L

):

Without loss of generality, we arrange the signals in the experiment I( L ) so that the
low type chooses action ai when observing signal si . Under these assumptions and ignoring
additive constant terms, the seller’s problem consists of choosing the information rent for the
high type, U ( H ) 0; and the diagonal entries ii 2 [0; 1] of the low-value type’s information
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structure I(

L

) to maximize
(1
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n
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L
L
)
i ii (

i=1
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L

{z

)=V (I(

L
i

max
i

L

);

L

!

+

1
|

}

)

max
i

H

t(

H
i

U(

{z

)=V (I ;

H

)

U(

H

H

) ;
}

(15)

)

subject to the high type’s incentive-compatibility constraint, which can be rewritten as
n
X

(

H
i ) ii

L
i

i=1

max
i

L
i

max
i

H
i

U(

H

):

(16)

By inspecting (15) and (16), it is immediate that a higher ii increases pro…ts and relaxes
the constraint for all ! i such that Li > H
i . In other words, if the low type believes a given
state ! i is more likely to occur than does the high type, the seller should send signal si
with probability one in that state. In particular, the optimal menu has ii = 1 for the state
corresponding to the low type’s default action.
With two states only (e.g., in example of Proposition 4), this implies the remaining entry
in row i is ij = 0. With N > 2 states, the seller has considerably more instruments to
distort the low type’s allocation. In particular, the partially informative experiment may
contain fewer signals than available actions–and, thus, the seller may “drop” some signals
from I( L ) to reduce the information rents. The logic above then suggests that the seller
should distort the signal distribution in states the high type deems very likely but the low
type does not.
To formalize this intuition, we re-order the states ! i by the likelihood ratios of the two
types’beliefs. In particular, let
L
1
H
1

L
i
H
i

L
N
:
H
N

(17)

We then de…ne two particular states. The …rst state is de…ned as
i = min i :

L
i
H
i

,

(18)

which is well-de…ned because the likelihood ratio must exceed one for some i.
To de…ne the second state, consider the following quantity:
kj ,

Pn

i=j+1

L
i

H
i

maxi
H
j

22

L
j

L
i

+ maxi

H
i

:

(19)

In particular, kj corresponds to the value of jj that satis…es (16) with equality when the
high type’s rent is nil, ii = 1 for all states i > j, and ii = 0 for all i < j. Let
j , min j : kj

(20)

0;

which is also well-de…ned since the de…nition of the low type implies that at least kN
Proposition 5 establishes several properties of any optimal menu.

0:

Proposition 5 (Optimal Menu with Two Types)
1. Experiment I(

L

) has

ii

= 0 for all i < min fi ; j g and

2. If j < i , then I(

L

) has

j j

= kj and U (

3. If j

L

) has

i i

= 1 and U (

i , then I(

H

H

ii

= 1 for all i > min fi ; j g.

) = 0.

) > 0.

To complete the description of the optimal experiment I( L ), we need to specify the
distribution of signals ij for i < min fi ; j g. In the Appendix, we construct an algorithm
that assigns the entries ij in such a way that both types always follow the recommendation
implied by each signal. Therefore, the solution to the relaxed problem solves our original
problem. The resulting optimal experiment I( L ) has a lower triangular shape, with ii 2
fki ; 1g depending on whether i 7 j , as described in Proposition 5:
0
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.
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.
..
.
0

0
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.
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0

1i

1n

..
.

..
.

ii

in

0
..
.

1
..
.

0

0

..

.
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0
..
.
1

Intuitively, the seller’s choice of experiments in the optimal menu depends on two factors: (a) the two types’relative beliefs, and (b) the distribution of types in the population.
Proposition 5 shows that the problem is separable in this respect. In particular, the optimal
experiment I( L ) is chosen from a discrete set that depends only on the two types H ; L .
Each element of this set distorts progressively more signals, as in (21). The distribution of
types then determines the optimal element of the set, i.e., the number of null columns and
value of the diagonal entry in the critical state min fi ; j g.
More speci…cally, the extent of the two types’belief disagreement guides the seller’s choice
of a partially informative experiment. The seller is most willing to introduce noise in signals
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that the low type considers relatively less likely than the high type because these distortions
facilitate screening without sacri…cing surplus. That is, distortions are more likely to occur
in states that maximize relative disagreement. The extent of disagreement is captured by the
critical state j that represents the minimum number of signals that must be eliminated in
order to satisfy incentive compatibility, while holding the high type to his reservation utility.
Finally, the pro…tability of distorting experiment I( L ) depends on the distribution of
types. In particular, the measure of high types (captured by the critical state i ) represents
the shadow cost of providing information to the low types. For high shadow cost, the
monopolist is willing to distort the allocation by removing as many signals as necessary to
satisfy (16) and hold the high type to his participation constraint. For low opportunity cost,
the monopolist prefers to limit distortions and concede rents to the high type. Thus, the
informativeness of the low type’s experiment is decreasing in the fraction of high types .
The following examples with three states and actions illustrate Proposition 5.
Example 1 (Noncongruent Priors) Let L = (1=10; 1=10; 4=5) and H = (2=5; 3=10; 3=10).
Because k1 < 0 < k2 , the partially informative experiment I( L ) can involve dropping signal
s1 , i.e., setting 11 = 0. In particular, the optimal experiment I( L ) is given by
I(

L

) s1

!1
!2
!3

1
0
0
if

s2

s3

I(

0 0
1 0
0 1
< 1=3;

L

) s1

!1
!2
!3

0
0
0
if

The high type obtains positive rents only if

s2

s3

I(

1=4 3=4
1
0
0
1
2 [1=4; 1=3] ;

L

) s1

!1
!2
!3

0
0
0
if

s2

s3

1=4 3=4
1=2 1=2
0
1
> 1=3.

< 1=3.

Example 2 shows that discriminatory pricing can be pro…table even if the two types have
congruent beliefs, as long as the likelihood ratio Li = H
i takes more than two distinct values.
Example 2 (Congruent Priors) Let H = (3=10; 2=5; 3=10) and
Because k1 > 0, an optimal experiment I( L ) is given by
I(

L

) s1

!1
!2
!3

1
0
0
if

s2
0
1
0

s3

I(

0
0
1
1=3,

The high type obtains positive rents only if

L

) s1

!1
!2
!3

< 1=3.
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s2

s3

1=2 0 1=2
0
1 0
0
0 1
if > 1=3.

L

= (1=10; 1=2; 2=5).

The key property of Example 2 is that, even though both types initially deem state ! 2 the
L
L
H
most likely, they disagree on the relative likelihood of states ! 1 and ! 3 , i.e., H
1 = 3 6= 1 = 3 : If
> 1=3, then in the optimal menu, the seller o¤ers type L an experiment I( L ) that reveals
state ! 1 with a conditional probability of 1=2: Because type L assigns prior probability
1=10 to state ! 1 only, this distortion does not reduce his willingness to pay considerably.
Conversely, the prior beliefs of type H assign a much larger weight to state ! 1 , which means
he perceives the quality of experiment I( L ) as signi…cantly lower, enabling the seller to
charge a high price for the full information structure I( H ).
Thus, with more than two states, the seller can exploit disagreement along any dimension
and extract all the surplus through discriminatory pricing. Nonetheless, it is not always
pro…table to o¤er two distinct experiments. In Example 2, if high-value types are su¢ ciently
scarce (
1=3), the seller prefers to pool the two types. Corollary 2 identi…es two polar
cases in which the distribution of types pins down the rent of the high type.
Corollary 2 (Information Rents)
1. If < mini Li = H
i , both types purchase the fully informative experiment I and the high
type obtains positive rent U ( H ) > 0.
2. If

>

L
H
i = i

for all i such that

L
H
i = i

< 1, the high type obtains no rent.

Finally, Corollary 3 deals with the case of exclusion. It generalizes the intuition from the
fully binary model in which noncongruent priors remove the need to exclude the low type.
Corollary 3 (Exclusion)
1. If priors are noncongruent or if they are congruent but the two types do not lie on a
ray in the simplex, it is never optimal to exclude type L .
2. In both cases, the experiment I(

4.3

L

) is partially informative if

is su¢ ciently large.

More than Two Types

With more than two types and N > 2, our relaxed approach is not always valid— in the
optimal menu, di¤erent types would choose di¤erent actions in response to the same signal
realizations. More formally, it is always without loss of generality – see Proposition 1 – to
assume that type follows the recommendation of each signal in his own experiment I ( ).
However, type need not follow the recommendation of every signal in other experiments
I( 0 ). The full incentive-compatibility constraints can then be written as
N
X
j=1

j

jj

( )

t( )

N
X
j=1
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max
i

i ij

( 0)

t ( 0) :

(22)

In this case, computing the optimal menu is more di¢ cult. Nevertheless, the max operator
in (22) can be captured by a set of additional linear inequality constraints. Thus, for a
discrete type space and at the cost of additional complexity, the monopolist’s problem can
still be solved via (numerical) linear programming, as illustrated by the following example.
Example 3 (Signals and Actions) Let types 1 = (1=6; 1=6; 2=3), 2 = (1=2; 1=2; 0), and
3
= (1=2; 0; 1=2) be uniformly distributed. In the relaxed problem, the monopolist sells the
fully informative experiment to types 2 and 3 . Type 1 buys
I( 1 ) s1
!1
!2
!3

s2

s3

1=2 0
0
1
0
0

However, when contemplating buying I 1 , type
signal s3 . In the solution to the full problem, I
I( 1 ) s1
!1
!2
!3

1=2
:
0
1
2
1

s2

would choose action a1 when observing
is given by
s3

1=2 0
1=2
:
1=2 1=2 0
0
0
1

(23)

It is easy to see that, in Example 3, no experiment I( 1 ) can lead both types 2 and 3
to follow the action recommended by every signal. Thus, the solutions to the relaxed and
general problems must di¤er.
Relationship with the Monopoly Bundling Problem At a …rst glance, the problem
of the data buyer resembles a consumer’s demand for multiple goods or bundles of characteristics. We recall that the value of an information structure is given by:
V (I; ) =

X
j

max f
i

ij i g

max f i g .
i

(24)

We can interpret the buyer’s type as a vector of tastes, states ! i as products, and the
likelihood function as the quantity of each product available to the consumer. With this
interpretation, an experiment I generates a random allocation s 2 S. Observing signal sj
is then analogous to being o¤ered the set of options ( 1j ; : : : ; N j ). Finally, the consumer
chooses a single product from the set according to his tastes. Consequently, the consumer’s
utility is convex in the probability distribution over options, generating the upward kinks
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in (24). In addition, type-dependent reservation utilities generate the downward kinks. In
contrast, in bundling problems, buyers’utilities are typically linear in the goods they acquire,
and their outside options are nil.
Now, as the data buyer must ultimately choose an action, acquiring information introduces an additional choice variable (and optimality condition) represented by the …rst max
operator in (24). Hence, the data buyer’s problem does not reduce to selecting a bundle of
goods from a menu. Indeed, a buyer of incremental information behaves like a consumer
with unit demand who faces a stochastic choice problem. This property of buying information brings additional incentive constraints to the seller’s problem di¤erentiating it from a
multiproduct monopolist’s problem. Furthermore, the outside option for the buyer is given
by his initial information. This is re‡ected in the second max operator in (24). Thus, the
participation constraint is naturally type dependent.
Despite these important di¤erences, our seller’s problem bears some resemblance to a
bundling problem. In particular, when buyers’ types are multidimensional (i.e., N > 2 in
our case), it is well-known— see, for example, Pavlov (2011b)— that the single-price result of
Myerson (1981) and Riley and Zeckhauser (1983) does not hold. Indeed, the optimal menu
involves stochastic bundling quite generally, and the structure of the bundles o¤ered can be
quite rich.7 Partially informative experiments are the analog of stochastic bundles in our
model. To further mark the di¤erence to these classic multidimensional problems, stochastic
bundling can arise in our setting even when buyer types are one-dimensional. This aspect
emerged in the fully binary setting of Proposition 4, which we generalize in the next section.

5

Optimal Menu with a Continuum of Types

Finally, we return to the environment with binary actions and states and allow for a continuum of types. Letting , Pr [! 1 ], the value of information is given in (11), i.e.,
V (I; ) , max f

11

+

22

(1

)

maxf ; 1

g; 0g .

Because types are one dimensional, we can de…ne for each experiment I ( ) the following
measure of relative informativeness,
q( ) ,

11 (

)

22 (

7

) 2 [ 1; 1] :

For example, see Manelli and Vincent (2006), Pycia (2006), Pavlov (2011a), and Rochet and Thanassoulis
(2015). In particular, Daskalakis, Deckelbaum, and Tzamos (2015) construct an example where types follow
a Beta distribution, and the optimal menu contains a continuum of stochastic allocations.
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For each , Proposition 2 implies that either 11 ( ) = 1 or 22 ( ) = 1 (or both). Therefore, we adopt the convention that q ( ) > 0 implies 11 ( ) = 1 and q ( ) < 0 implies
22 ( ) = 1. We can then more succinctly rewrite the value of an experiment q as
V (q; ) = max f q

g; 0g :

maxfq; 0g + minf ; 1

(25)

With this notation, the two information structures q 2 f 1; 1g correspond to releasing no
information to the buyer. (These experiments show the same signal with probability one.)
Conversely, the fully informative experiment is given by q = 0.
The value of information in (25) re‡ects the more general properties of our screening
problem: (a) buyers have type-dependent participation constraints;8 (b) buyer type = 1=2
has the highest willingness to pay for any experiment q; (c) the experiment q = 0 is the
most valuable for all types ; (d) di¤erent types rank partially informative experiments
di¤erently; and (e) the utility function V (q; ) has the single-crossing property in ( ; q).
The single-crossing property indicates that buyers with a higher , who are relatively
more optimistic about state ! 1 , assign a relatively higher value to experiments with a higher
q— such experiments contain a signal that is more revealing of state ! 2 , which they deem
less likely. However, the “vertical quality” and “horizontal position” of an information
product cannot be chosen separately by the seller. In particular, it is not possible to change
the relative informativeness of a product (i.e., choose a very high or very low q) without
reducing its overall informativeness.
Recall that Proposition 1 allows us to focus on responsive allocations. Therefore, we
simplify the problem by eliminating the …rst max operator from (25). Next, we derive a
characterization of all implementable responsive allocations q. Observe that the buyer’s utility function has a downward kink in . This is a consequence of having an interior type
( = 1=2) assign the highest value to any allocation and of the linearity of the buyer’s problem. We thus compute the buyer’s rents U ( ) on [0; 1=2] and [1=2; 1] by applying the envelope
theorem to each interval separately. We then obtain two possibly di¤erent expressions for
the rent of type = 1=2. However, continuity of the rent function then requires that
U (1=2) = U (0) +

Z

1=2

V (q; )d = U (1)

0

Z

1

V (q; )d :

1=2

Because types = 0 and = 1 assign zero value to any experiment and transfers are nonnegative, incentive compatibility requires U (0) = U (1) = 0. Therefore, while any type’s
8

In general, our setting involves both bunching and exclusion, making it di¢ cult to directly apply existing
approaches, such as the one in Jullien (2000).
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utility can always be written in the above form, the novel element of our model is that no
further endogenous variables appear.9 Di¤erentiating (25) with respect to and simplifying,
we obtain the following restriction on an incentive-compatible allocation
Z

1=2

(q ( ) + 1)d =

Z

1

(q ( )

1)d :

(26)

1=2

0

The constraint (26) is a new condition that sets our framework apart from most other screening problems. In particular, incentive constraints impose an aggregate (integral) constraint
on the allocation.10 We formalize this in the following result.
Lemma 1 (Implementable Allocations)
Any responsive allocation q is implementable if and only if the following two conditions hold:
q ( ) 2 [ 1; 1] is non-decreasing;
Z 1
and
q ( ) d = 0:

(27)

0

The transfers t ( ) associated with the allocation q( ) can be computed in the usual
way on the two intervals [0; 1=2] and [1=2; 1] separately. With the addition of the integral
constraint (27) for implementability, we can state the seller’s problem as follows:
max
q( )

Z

1

F (1=2) F ( )
f( )

0

q( )

max fq ( ) ; 0g dF ( ) ;

(28)

s.t. q ( ) 2 [ 1; 1] non-decreasing,
Z 1
q ( ) d = 0:
0

5.1

Optimal Menu

In order to solve the seller’s problem (28) and characterize the optimal menu, we rewrite the
objective with the density f ( ) explicitly in each term:
Z

1

[( f ( ) + F ( )) q ( )

0

9

max fq ( ) ; 0g f ( )] d :

For instance, in Mussa and Rosen (1978) and in Myerson (1981), the rent of the highest type U (1)
depends on the entire allocation q.
10
The integral constraint thus di¤ers from other instances of screening under integral constraints (e.g.,
constraints on transfers due to budget or enforceability, or capacity constraints). In the model of persuasion
with private information of Kolotilin, Li, Mylovanov, and Zapechelnyuk (2015) a similar integral constraint
appears as a persuasion budget constraint. However, because theirs is a model without transfers, the constraint operates di¤erently and has very di¤erent implications.
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This minor modi…cation highlights two important features of our problem: (i) the constraint
and the objective have generically di¤erent weights, d and dF ( ); and, hence, (ii) the
problem is non-separable in the type and the allocation, which interact in two di¤erent
terms. In particular, consider the “virtual values” ( ; q), de…ned as the partial derivative
of the integrand with respect to q. Unlike in standard separable models, the virtual values
are a function of the allocation. Because our objective is piecewise linear, the function ( ; q)
takes on two values only, i.e.,
8
< f( )+F ( )
for q < 0;
( ; q) :=
:(
1)f ( ) + F ( ) for q > 0:

Heuristically, the two virtual values represent the marginal bene…t to the seller (ignoring the
constraint) of increasing each type’s allocation from 1 to 0, and from 0 to 1, respectively.
If ironing à la Myerson is required, we denote the ironed virtual value for experiment q
as ( ; q). Finally, we say that the allocation satis…es the pooling property if it is constant
on any interval where the relevant (ironed) virtual value is constant. The solution to the
seller’s problem is then obtained by combining standard Lagrange methods with the ironing
procedure developed by Toikka (2011), which extends the approach of Myerson (1981).
Proposition 6 (Optimal Allocation Rule)
The allocation q ( ) is optimal if and only if:
1. there exists

> 0 such that, for all ,
q ( ) = arg max
q

Z

q

( ; x)

dx ;

1

2. q has the pooling property and satis…es the integral constraint (27).
To gain some intuition, observe that the problem is piecewise-linear (but concave) in the
allocation. Thus, absent the integral constraint, the seller would choose an allocation that
takes values at the kinks, i.e. q ( ) 2 f 1; 0; 1g for all . In other words, the seller would
o¤er a menu containing the fully informative experiment only. Flat pricing turns out to be
optimal for the seller in a number of circumstances. The main novel result of this section is
that the seller can sometimes do better by o¤ering one additional experiment.
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Proposition 7 (Optimal Menu)
An optimal menu consists of at most two experiments.
1. The …rst experiment is fully informative.
2. The second experiment contains a signal that perfectly reveals one state.
To obtain some intuition for this result, consider a relaxed problem where the seller
contracts separately with buyers < 1=2 and > 1=2: Because of the linearity of the
problem, the optimal menu for each group is degenerate: the seller o¤ers the perfectly
revealing experiment at a ‡at price. Now, consider the solution to the full problem. If
the optimal prices for each separate group are similar, the seller o¤ers the fully informative
experiment at an intermediate price. If they are quite di¤erent, the seller prefers to distort the
information sold to one group to maintain a high price for the fully informative experiment.
However, the linearity of the environment prevents the seller from o¤ering more than one
distorted experiment, i.e., no further versioning is optimal.
We now illustrate the optimal menu under ‡at and discriminatory pricing separately.

5.2

Flat vs. Discriminatory Pricing

Let types be uniformly distributed, F ( ) = , and consider the virtual values ( ; q) for
q < 0 and q 0 separately. These values are constant in q; hence, we refer to ( ; 1) and
( ; 1), respectively. For a given value of the multiplier , the allocation that maximizes
the expected virtual surplus in Proposition 6 assigns q ( ) = 1 to all types for which
( ; 1) < ; it assigns q ( ) = 0 to all types for which ( ; 1) > > ( ; 1); and
q ( ) = 1 for all types for which ( ; 1) > .

Figure 7: Uniform Distribution: Virtual Values and Optimal Allocation
Figure 7 illustrates the resulting allocation rule. In order to satisfy the integral constraint,
the optimal value of the multiplier
must identify two symmetric threshold types ( 1 ; 2 )
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that separate types receiving the e¢ cient allocation q = 0 from those receiving no information
at all, q = 1 or q = 1. The allocation then clearly satis…es the integral constraint (27).
More generally, if both virtual values ( ; 1) and ( ; 1) are strictly increasing in , the
optimal menu consists of charging the monopoly price for the fully informative experiment.
Flat pricing is optimal under weaker conditions than strictly increasing virtual values.
We now summarize the su¢ cient conditions for this result.
Proposition 8 (Flat Pricing) Suppose any of the following conditions hold:
1. F ( ) + f ( ) and F ( ) + (
2. the density f ( ) = 0 for all

1)f ( ) are strictly increasing;
> 1=2 or

< 1=2;

3. or the density f ( ) is symmetric around

= 1=2.

The optimal menu contains only the fully informative experiment.
An implication of Proposition 8 is that the seller o¤ers a second experiment only if ironing
is required. At the same time, there exist examples with non-monotone virtual values and
one-item menus. Distributions that are symmetric around 1=2 are one such instance: for
any distribution F ( ), the solution to the restricted problem on [0; 1=2] or [1=2; 1] is a cuto¤
policy. Because the cuto¤s under symmetric distribution are themselves symmetric, the
solutions to the two subproblems satisfy the integral constraint and, hence, provide a tight
upper bound to the seller’s pro…ts.
The monotonicity conditions of Proposition 8 that guarantee increasing virtual values
are quite demanding. When types correspond to interim beliefs, it is natural to consider
bimodal densities (e.g., a well-informed population in a binary model) that fail the regularity
conditions and, therefore, introduce the need for ironing. For example, starting from the
common prior, if buyers observe binary signals, a bimodal distribution of beliefs would
result with types holding beliefs above and below the mean of the common prior . Thus,
non-monotone densities and distributions violating the standard monotonicity conditions are
a natural benchmark. Therefore, ironing is not a technical curiosity in our case, but rather a
technique that becomes unavoidable because of the features of the information environment.
We now illustrate the ironing procedure when virtual values are not monotone and how
it leads to a richer (two-item) optimal menu. Figure 8 considers a bimodal distribution of
types, illustrating the probability density function and the associated virtual values.11
11

The distribution in the left panel represents a “perturbation”of the two-type example in Section 4.1. In
particular, it is a mixture (with equal weights) of two Beta distributions with parameters (8; 30) and (60; 30).
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Figure 8: Probability Density Function and Virtual Values
We therefore consider the “ironed” versions of each virtual value and identify the equilibrium value of the multiplier . In this example, the value of the multiplier must equal
the constant level of one of the virtual values.
Figure 9 illustrates the optimal two-item menu. For types in the “pooling” region 2
[0:17; 0:55], the seller is indi¤erent among all values of q 2 [ 1; 0]. The optimal allocation
(q
0:22) is pinned down by (the pooling property and) the integral constraint.
In both examples, extreme types with a low value of information are excluded from
the purchase of informative signals. In the latter example, the monopolist o¤ers a second
information structure that is tailored towards relatively lower types. This structure (with
q < 0) contains one signal that perfectly reveals the high state. This experiment is relatively
unattractive for higher types, and it allows the monopolist to increase the price for the large
mass of types located around
0:7.

Figure 9: Ironed Virtual Values and Optimal Allocation
The properties of the optimal discriminatory pricing scheme re‡ect the fact that the type
structure is quite di¤erent from the standard screening environment. While information
rents U ( ) peak at = 1=2, the ex ante least informed type = 1=2 need not purchase the
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fully informative experiment, despite having the highest value of information.12 In the above
example, inducing the types around = 1=2 to purchase the fully informative experiment
would require further distortions (hence, a lower price) for the second experiment. This leads
to a loss of revenue from types around
0:2. Because such types are quite frequent, this
loss more than o¤sets the gain in revenue from types around 1=2.

6

Implications for Data Pricing

Menu pricing of information products is widely used by many data sellers, including genetic
testing companies, credit score agencies, and big data brokers. The former two o¤er menus
of products consisting of tests or inquiries that reveal, with varying degrees of con…dence, a
patient’s predisposition to develop a disease or a borrower’s risk of default. The latter o¤er
both standardized and customized data services that facilitate targeting advertisements to
speci…c consumers.13
In this Section, we relate the solution to our screening problem to the practical design of
information products. In a nutshell, our seller’s problem consists of degrading the quality of
the information sold to some buyers in order to charge higher prices to “premium”buyers.14
Our results contribute to identifying systematic patterns in the optimal design of “distorted”
partially informative experiments.
Remark 1 (No White Noise) No product in an optimal menu adds unbiased noise to the
seller’s information. Instead, each product contains “directionally informative” signals.
Proposition 2 shows that every experiment is non-dispersed and, therefore, the buyer
always takes the correct action in at least one state. In reality, sellers hardly have perfect
information about the state. Nonetheless, in the special case of binary states and actions,
every optimal experiment minimizes the type-II error for any level of type-I error (as in
Figure 2). This result has several practical implications.
Genetic testing companies such as Ambry Genetics exploit advances in sequencing technology to identify gene mutations associated with various diseases. The tests on its menu
12

This feature of the optimal menu already emerges in three type examples. Type = 1=2 nevertheless
obtains the highest information rent.
13
Brokers such as Acxiom and Oracle o¤er Data Management Platforms— customized software that
automates the integration of 1st- and 3rd-party data, enabling websites to track their users and place
them into more precise market segments— as well as less ‡exible data packages (see, for example,
http://www.acxiom.com/data-packages/). Similarly, AddThis o¤ers a choice between using a customized
consumer audience and a standard audience (http://www.addthis.com/custom-audiences).
14
Our setting di¤ers from the “damaged goods”model of Deneckere and McAfee (1996) because degrading
quality is costless.

34

vary mainly in the number of genes tested for each medical condition. Importantly, the lowend products always test a strict subset of the genes tested by the higher-end products.15
Through the lens of our model, all such tests eliminate the type-I error, and buyers are
screened on the basis of their relative distaste for di¤erent types of statistical errors.
Similarly, credit reporting agencies such as Equifax do not o¤er both precise and noisy
versions of the same information (e.g., computing a consumer’s credit score on the basis of
more or less detailed data). Instead, Equifax o¤ers its business customers products such as
“Prescreen” and “Undisclosed Debt Monitoring.” The former identi…es consumers who are
likely to open and maintain an account. Among other criteria, it uses a ‡exible threshold
on the credit score to construct the target list. Varying the threshold then corresponds to
varying the information provided in an optimal way, balancing the trade-o¤ between typeI and type-II errors. The latter identi…es default risk based on new information arriving
between the time of the original credit inquiry and the closing of the loan. This product’s
versions di¤er in the number of events (e.g., late payments or inquiries made to competing
agencies Experian and Transunion) that are monitored for potentially “bad news.”
This approach to selling consumer-level information is in sharp contrast to earlier methods. For instance, mailing lists are typically sold at the level of mail-carrier routes.16 From
the information buyer’s point of view, using approximate information (e.g., one’s home address as a proxy for income) inevitably allows for both types of statistical errors.
Remark 2 (Targeted and Residual Categories) With two buyer types, all states (except one at most) are partitioned into targeted states that send non-dispersed information
and residual states that send dispersed signals. Only actions corresponding to targeted states
are chosen with positive probability.
Proposition 5 characterizes the optimal menu for the binary type setting. With two
buyer types, the partially informative experiment is represented by the triangular matrix
(21). This means that the seller chooses a subset of “targeted” realized states in which the
buyer always takes the correct action. Conversely, when a “residual” state is realized, the
buyer never takes the correct action. In other words, some states are used to “degrade”the
information revealed about the targeted states. This property of the optimal menu resonates
with the design of the information products o¤ered by online data brokers.
In the online advertising market, data brokers record several attributes for each individual
consumer. They then o¤er “data packages” to advertisers. Such packages can be viewed as
15

For example, breast and ovarian cancer tests examine between 2 and 17 genes. Their prices range from
$400 to $3900 (http://www.ambrygen.com/sites/default/…les/Master_Pricelist_testCode_2.pdf).
16
See http://mailways.net or the paper by Anderson and Simester (2013) on direct marketing.
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experiments where each signal “‡ags”a consumer segment. If we view a state realization as
a speci…c consumer pro…le (i.e., a combination of attributes), every optimal signal will ‡ag
a segment consisting of all consumers …tting a single pro…le and will also include additional,
heterogeneous consumers.
Data brokers choose which segments to include in each package on the basis of the relative
demand for each individual consumer pro…le. A very coarse data package would, for example,
partition the consumer population into segments corresponding to an “Advertise”and a “Do
Not Advertise” recommendation. Depending on which consumer pro…les advertisers wish
to include and exclude— both kinds of targeting strategies are empirically relevant— data
packages may lead to excessively broad or excessively narrow campaigns.17
Remark 3 (Simple Menus for Simple Problems) Regardless of the heterogeneity in the
consumer population, the optimal menu for binary choice problems contains two items— a
“full” version and a “light” version of the seller’s information.
Proposition 7 establishes the optimality of two-item menus for binary state and action
problems. While there are other reasons to o¤er relatively coarse menus, our results shed
light on how the complexity of the buyer’s decision problem is related to the complexity of
the optimal menu— not just to the cardinality of the signal space by Proposition 1.
For example, in the case of genetic testing, the main choice of action consists of whether
to order additional exams or increase the frequency with which a patient is monitored. In
line with our results, Ambry Genetics o¤ers a rich product line targeting several diseases.
However, within each condition (e.g., a certain type of cancer or cardiac disease), very few
options are typically available— one that covers all the genes the company is able to test and
another that induces type-II errors.18
Two-item menus are also used by LinkedIn to sell member pro…les to potential employers
who, essentially, must decide whom to interview: a Lite version that allows one to condition
searches on a limited number of criteria and a Premium version that grants access to the
entire database. Conversely, in the case of online advertising, the action space is much
larger (e.g., how much to invest and which product to advertise). Customization of the data
packages then leads to a menu with a far greater number of options.
17

In our earlier work (Bergemann and Bonatti, 2015), we examined a linear pricing problem for individual
consumer pro…les, i.e., “cookies.”
18
Passing the genetic test does not guarantee that the patient will not develop the disease. In that sense,
the seller has only partial information (whose accuracy depends on the disease). For our purposes, we can,
however, identify the fully informative experiment with the revelation of all the seller’s information.
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7

Conclusions

We have studied the problem of a monopolist who sells incremental information to privately informed buyers. Fundamental to the seller’s incentives to degrade information is
the Bayesian nature of the buyer’s problem. In particular, selling information introduces a
novel aspect of horizontal di¤erentiation across buyer types that widens the scope for price
discrimination through directional information.
We have deliberately focused on the “packaging” or versioning problem of a seller who
is (a) free to acquire and degrade information, and (b) uninterested in the buyer’s actions.
Thus, our results provide only a …rst pass at understanding the trade-o¤s involved in selling
information products. A richer model would distinguish the cost of acquiring information
(i.e., building the database) from the cost of duplicating and distributing the information.
Furthermore, in many applications, it is costly to introduce noise in the data . This occurs,
for instance, when the seller is concerned with preserving the anonymity of her information.
Selling pre-packaged data is just one mechanism for trading information. For instance,
large providers of online advertising space, such as Google and Microsoft, do not just sell
information— they also internalize advertisers’ spending decisions. Thus, they e¤ectively
bundle data and advertising products by o¤ering a menu of targeting opportunities. In
this sense, our approach is better suited to analyze a data broker’s pricing problem when
merchants wish to buy targeted “advertising products”from a di¤erent seller. At the same
time, this application suggests an interesting model with a richer contract space.
Finally, we have relied solely on belief heterogeneity to motivate the sale of incremental
information. However, buyers of information may di¤er along several alternative or additional dimensions. For example, buyers of time-sensitive data can be screened according to
how much they value timely information.19 Each of these extensions can be implemented in
the framework we have outlined. Combining di¤erent sources of heterogeneity (e.g., beliefs
and discount rates) appears more challenging but promises additional insights.

19

Essentially homogeneous information products that di¤er in availability timing include: the Consumer
Sentiment Index released by Thomson-Reuters and the University of Michigan, as well as the Exome tests
for prenatal genetic diagnoses o¤ered by Ambry Genetics.
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A

Appendix

Proof of Proposition 1. Consider any type and experiment I. Let SIa denote the sets
of the signals in experiment I that induce type to choose action a. Thus, [a2A SIa = SI .
Construct the experiment I 0 as a recommendation for type based on the experiment I,
SI 0 = fsa ga2A and
Z
I0

(sa j!) =

I

SIa

(s j !) ds ! 2 ; a 2 A:

By construction, I 0 induces the same outcome distribution for type as I so V (I 0 ; ) =
V (I; ). At the same time, I 0 is a garbling of I so by Blackwell’s theorem V (I 0 ; 0 )
V (I; 0 ) 8 0 . Thus, for any incentive compatible and individually rational direct mechanism
fI ( ) ; t ( )g we can construct another direct mechanism fI 0 ( ) ; t ( )g with its experiments
leading type to take a di¤erent action after observing each signal s 2 S ( ) that is also
incentive compatible and individually rational, and yields weakly larger pro…ts.
Proof of Proposition 2. The argument for part (1.) is given in the text. For part
(2.), consider any individually rational and incentive compatible direct mechanism M =
fI ( ) ; t ( )g. Fix a type with the associated experiment I ( ) and let ij ( ) denote the
conditional probability of signal sj in state ! i under experiment I ( ). By Proposition 1,
each type has a di¤erent optimal action for each signal in I ( ). Without loss of generality,
we then arrange the signals in I ( ) so that type takes action ai when observing si . If type
never takes action ai , we drop signal si from I ( ), i.e. we set the i-th column of ( ) to
zero. Because beliefs i i = 1, we can write the value of information (4) as
"

V (I ( ) ; ) =

N
X

( )

max
i

i=1

"N 1
X

=

i ii

i

(

ii

( )

NN

i

#+

( )) +

NN

( )

i=1

max
i

i

#+

.

(29)

Now de…ne " ( ) := 1 max ii ( ), and construct a new experiment I 0 ( ) where 0ii ( ) =
ii ( )+" ( ) for all i and for all . For each state ! i , the o¤-diagonal entries ij ( ) with j 6= i,
are correspondingly reduced by " ( ), without further restrictions on how this is operation is
performed. It then follows from (29) that
[V (I 0 ( ) ; )
Furthermore, for all types

0

+

" ( )] = V (I ( ) ; ) :

6= , the value of mimicking type
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increases by less than " ( )

(strictly so, if type 0 6= responds to the signals in I ( ) di¤erently from type ). Suppose
type 0 chooses action ai(j) upon observing signal sj from experiment I ( ). We then have
0

V (I ( ) ; ) =

"

N
X

0
i(j) i(j)j

j=1

( )

max
i

0
i

#+

Furthermore, because i (j) need not coincide with j, the entries
at most by " ( ). Therefore, we have
[V (I 0 ( ) ; 0 )

+

" ( )]

:

i(j)j

in V (I ( ) ; 0 ) increase

V (I ( ) ; 0 ) .

Consequently, the direct mechanism M0 = fI 0 ( ) ; t ( ) + " ( )g is also individually rational
and incentive compatible. Moreover, all experiments I ( ) are non-dispersed by construction,
and all transfers are weakly greater than in the original mechanism M.
Proof of Proposition 3. (i) We know from Proposition 2 that at least one type must buy
the fully informative experiment I . Suppose only type L buys I as part of the optimal
menu. Then the price of I is at most V (I ; L ). By incentive compatibility, if the high
type H purchases I 6= I , it must be that t( H ) < V (I ; L ). Therefore, eliminating the
experiment I( H ) from the menu strictly improves the seller’s pro…ts. Contradiction. (iii)
The participation constraint of L must bind. Indeed, some participation constraint must
bind, otherwise increase both prices. To the contrary, let the constraint of H bind and not of
L
. Since H is served by I then t( H ) = V I ; H
V I ; L . Hence can increase t( L )
without violating incentive compatibility. (ii) The incentive constraint of H must bind. To
the contrary, assume that it does not bind. Then there are two cases. If H participation
constraint doesn’t bind then can increase t( H ): If H participation constraint binds then it
must be that I( L ) is not equal to I . Since payo¤s are continuous in ij we can increase
both informativeness of I( L ) and t( L ).
Proof of Proposition 4. (1.) Consider the case of congruent priors. It follows from
Proposition 5 that an optimal menu contains the fully informative experiment only. The
H
L
value for this experiment are 1
and 1
for the high and the low type, respectively.
H
L
The pro…ts from non-exclusive and exclusive pricing are
1
and 1
. Thus, it is
L
H
optimal for both types to participate if and only if
(1
)=(1
).
L
(2.) Consider the case of noncongruent priors. Let q , 11
=
22 and denote q
L
H
H
q( ); q = q( ). It follows again from Proposition 5 that in, an optimal menu, we have
qL
0 and q H = 0. If
< L = H , we wish to show that ‡at pricing is optimal, i.e.,
L
q L = q H = 0 and t1 = t2 = 1
. Now, for an arbitrary incentive compatible menu
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q H ; q L ; tH ; tL de…ne the following modi…cation:
q H0 ; tH0 ; q L0 ; tL0 = q H ; tH

"

H

L

; q L + "; tL + " 1

L

(30)

:

If q L < 0, the modi…cation (30) with " 2 (0; qL ) preserves incentive compatibility and
improves pro…ts by " H ( L ) > 0, which yields a contradiction.
Finally, we wish to show that if > L = H , then discriminatory pricing is optimal. Notice
…rst that the individual rationality of the high type must bind, q H = 0; tH = 1 H , otherwise
modi…cation (30) would be pro…table for some " < 0. Second, the q L and tL maximize the
payment of the low type, subject to his individual rationality constraint and to the high
type’s incentive-compatibility constraint. At the optimum, both constraints bind, and the
solution is given by
2 H 1 L
1 L
H + L
L
q =
;t =
:
H
L
H

L

Substituting the de…nition of q yields the expression (14) in the statement.
Proof of Proposition 5. We know from Proposition 3 that the high type H purchases
the fully informative experiment. We now derive the optimal experiment I( L ). Suppose (as
we later verify) that both types H and L would choose action ai after observing signal si
from the optimal experiment I( L ). The seller then chooses ii 2 [0; 1] ; i = 1; : : : n to solve
the linear program (15) subject to (16). We can write the Lagrangian as
L = (1

)

" n
X

ii

L
i

L
i

+

H
i

max
i

i=1

L
i

+ max
i

H
i

+ U(

H

)

#

U(

H

);

where
0 represents the shadow value of increasing type the informational rent U (
It follows immediately that

ii

and that
U(

H

)=

8
>
if
< 0
=
[0; 1] if
>
:
1
if

( P
n

i=1 (

H

)

ii

+ maxi

L
i
L
i
L
i

+
+
+

L
i

0

L
i
L
i
L
i

maxi

H
i
H
i
H
i

H
i

< 0;
= 0;
> 0:

if
if

).

(31)

<

(1
(1

To characterize the solution, we need only identify the value of the multiplier
in the following steps.
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H

);
):

(32)
. We proceed

1. Recall states ! i are ordered by increasing likelihood ratio of beliefs Li = H
i , and consider
state ! 1 . If ! 1 is the only state i for which ii < 1, (31) implies that the multiplier is
given by
L
1
= min H
(33)
= L 1 H:
i
i
1 + 1
L + 1
i

Therefore, 11 solves (16) with equality, i.e., the candidate optimal value is 11 = k1
H
) = 0 and (31)
as de…ned in (19). If k1
0 and L1 = H
1 < , then (32) implies U (
H
L
implies we must set ii = 1 for all i
2: If instead < 1 = 1 then then 11 = 1
H
H
maxi H
and U ( ) > 0 solves (16), i.e., U ( ) = maxi Li
i : Finally, if k1 < 0 and
H
L
given in (33).
1 = 1 < , there is no solution with the value of
2. Suppose the above candidate solution is not, in fact, the optimum. The value of
the multiplier must then satisfy
> L1 =( L1 + H
1 ), which implies the non-negativity
constraint binds, i.e., 11 = 0: This means the optimal partially informative experiment
has less than full rank. The next candidate value for the multiplier
is L2 =( L2 + H
2 ).
L
H
H
Again, if k2 0 and 2 = 2 < , then (32) implies U ( ) = 0 and (31) implies ii = 1
H
for all i
3: If instead < L1 = H
) > 0 solves (16)
11 = 1 and U (
1 then then
L
H
with equality. Finally, if k2 < 0 and 2 = 2 < , there is no solution with the value
of
= L2 =( L2 + H
= L3 =( L3 + H
2 ) and the next candidate is
3 ); which implies
11 = 22 = 0:
3. The procedure iterates until either (a) state i is reached, i.e.,
j is reached, i.e., kj 0.

L
H
i = i

> , or (b) state

4. We must then verify that the o¤-diagonal entries ij , i 6= j can be set to ensure both
types H and L choose action ai when observing signal si . This requires
ii i

ji j

for both L and H and for all j < i, because the signal matrix can be taken to be
lower triangular. Fix a signal i and an alternative action aj . We need
i

ji

j

ii

:

H
L
L
By construction we have H
i = j < i = j for all i > j, hence, we need only worry
about the incentives of type H . We can then assign the probabilities ji following
the procedure described in Algorithm 1: for any i0 > i, we make type H indi¤erent
between following the recommendation of signal i0 and choosing actions ai ; we do so
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beginning with jn and proceeding backward as long as required; if the procedure
H
H
n
assigns positive weight to ji then it must be that ji = 1
s=i+1 s = j : It follows
that type H has strict incentives to follow the recommendation of signal i: Note that
ii 2 fki ; 1g, hence, if ii = ki , we have by de…nition
ki H
i

=

Now, because arg maxj
ki
A fortiori, type

H
i

>
H

Pn

s=i+1

L
j

H
s

maxj
H
i

L
j

+ maxj

H
j

L
i

H
i :

> i we can bound the above expression by

H
i
H
i

L
s

L
i

H
j

H
n
s=i+1 s

>

H
j

has strict incentives to choose ai if

H
n
s=i+1 s

ii

=

H
j

ji :

= 1.

This ends the proof.

Algorithm 1 (Optimal Menu with Binary Type) We construct the two optimal experiments as a function of the distribution of types. This algorithm contains three subroutines, beginning with the construction of the allocation described in part (1.) of Proposition 5. We refer to this allocation as the maximally informative zero rent experiment.
Maximally Informative Zero Rent Experiment. Order states i in increasing order of
H
the likelihood ratios Li = H
) = 0: Let ii = 1 for i = 2; : : : ; n and solve (16)
i and set U (
with equality with respect to 11 . The solution is given by k1 in (19). If k1
0, stop. If
k1 < 0, set 11 = 0 and ii = 1 for i = 3; : : : ; n: Solve (16) with equality with respect to 22 ;
which yields k2 . If k2 0, stop, otherwise iterate the procedure. The procedure terminates
at state j de…ned in (20).
We now use the distribution of types to identify which step of the construction yields the
pro…t-maximizing experiment.
Optimal Experiment. Begin at state j . If > Lj = H
j the maximally informative zero
L
H
rent experiment is part of the optimal menu. If < j = j , set j j = 1 and consider j 1.
H
If > Lj 1 = H
) > 0 to satisfy (16) with equality. Otherwise set
j 1 , stop, and choose U (
2; iterating until reaching state i de…ned in (18) and
j 1;j 1 = 1 and consider j
H
adjusting the rent U ( ) to satisfy the incentive constraint.
Thus, as the fraction of high types increases, the optimal menu involves potentially
steeper distortions. Conversely, when i = 1, the menu involves bunching both types at

42

the fully informative experiment. Finally, we illustrate a simple procedure to assign the
o¤-diagonal probabilities to the partially informative experiment.
O¤-Diagonal Entries. Suppose the optimal menu sets ii = 0 for all i < ^{, for some
^{ > 1. To assign the o¤ diagonal entries i;j with i < ^{ and j
^{; …x a state i < ^{ and
H
H
H
H
H
begin with signal n: Let in = minf n = i ; 1g. If n = i > 1, stop. If H
n = i < 1, set
H
H
H
H
i;n 1 = minf n 1 = i ; 1
n = i g, and proceed backwards until reaching i;i+1 . The entries
so constructed satisfy the recommendation constraint because, by the de…nition of kj in (19),
H
H
H
H
n
1
we have ^H
{ > k^{ ^{ > i
j=^{+1 j = i .
Proof of Lemma 1. We begin with necessity. Consider an incentive compatible allocation
q: For any two types 2 > 1 we have

V (q2 ;

V (q1 ;

1)

t1

V (q2 ;

1)

t2 ;

V (q2 ;

2)

t2

V (q1 ;

2)

t1 ;

2)

t2

2)

V (q1 ;

t1

V (q2 ;

1)

V (q1 ;

1) :

It follows from the single-crossing property of V (q; ) that q2 q1 hence q ( ) is increasing.
Because the buyer’s rent is di¤erentiable with respect to on [0; 1=2] and [1=2; 1] respectively, we can compute the function U ( ) on these two intervals separately. We obtain the
expression in the text,
U (1=2) = U (0) +

Z

1=2

V (q; ) d = U (1)

0

Z

1

V (q; ) d :

1=2

By the envelope theorem V (q; ) = q + 1 for < 1=2 and = q
because U (0) = U (1) we obtain
Z 1
q ( ) d = 0:

1 for

> 1=2. Finally,

0

We now turn to su¢ ciency. Suppose the allocation q is increasing and satis…es the integral
constraint. Then construct the following transfers
t( ) =

(

R
max fq ( ) ; 0g
q (x) dx if
R01
max fq ( ) ; 0g + q (x) dx if

q( )
q( )

Because the allocation satis…es the integral constraint, we have
Z

q (x) dx =

0
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Z

1

q (x) dx,

< 1=2;
1=2:

(34)

and we can express all transfers t ( ) as
t( ) = q( )
Finally, the expected utility of type
0

max fq ( ) ; 0g

q (x) dx.

0
0

from reporting type

0

V (q ( ) ; )

Z

0

t( ) = (

0

)q( ) +

Z

is given by

0

0

q (x) dx + min f ; 1

g.

Because q is monotone, the expression on the right-hand side is maximized at 0 = and,
hence, the incentive constraints are satis…ed. Finally, because the rent function U ( ) =
V (q ( ) ; ) t ( ) is non-negative for all 2 [0; 1], the participation constraints are satis…ed
as well.
Proof of Proposition 6. We …rst derive the seller’s objective in the usual way. Using (34),
we write the expected transfers as
Z

Z

1

t ( ) dF ( ) =

0

0

1

max fq ( ) ; 0g) dF ( )
Z 1 Z 1
q (x) dxdF ( ) :
q (x) dxdF ( ) +

( q( )
Z 1=2 Z
0

1=2

0

Integrating the last two terms by parts, we obtain
F (1=2)

Z

1=2

q (x) dx +

0

1=2

q (x) F (x) dx

F (1=2)

0

and hence
Z
Z 1
t ( ) dF ( ) =
0

Z

0

Z

1

q (x) dx +

1=2

Z

1

q (x) F (x) dx;

1=2

1

[( q ( )

max fq ( ) ; 0g) f ( )

(F (1=2)

F ( )) q ( )] d :

We now establish that the solution to the seller’s problem (28) can be characterized
through Lagrangian methods. For necessity, note that the objective is concave in the allocation rule; the set of non-decreasing functions is convex; and the integral constraint can be
weakened to the real-valued inequality constraint
Z

1

q( )d

0:

(35)

0

Necessity of the Lagrangian then follows from Theorem 8.3.1 in Luenberger (1969). Su¢ 44

ciency follows from Theorem 8.4.1 in Luenberger (1969). In particular, any solution maximizer of the Lagrangian q( ) with
Z 1
q( )d = q
0

maximizes the original objective subject to the inequality constraint
Z

1

q( )d

q:

0

Thus, any solution to the Lagrangian that satis…es the constraint solves the original problem.
Because the Lagrangian approach is valid, we apply the results of Toikka (2011) to solve
the seller’s problem for a given value of the multiplier on the integral constraint. Write
the Lagrangian as
Z

1

[( f ( ) + F ( )

)q( )

0

max fq ( ) ; 0g f ( )] d :

In order to maximize the Lagrangian subject to the monotonicity constraint, consider the
generalized virtual surplus
J( ; q) :=

Z

q

( ; x)

dx;

1

where ( ; x) denotes the ironed virtual value for allocation x. Note that J( ; q) is weakly
concave in q. Because the multiplier shifts all virtual values by a constant, the result in
Proposition 6 then follows from Theorem 4.4 in Toikka (2011). Finally, note that ( ; q) 0
for all implies the value
is strictly positive (otherwise the solution q would have a
strictly positive integral). Therefore, the integral constraint (35) binds.
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Proof of Proposition 7. From the Lagrangian maximization, we have the following necessary conditions

and

8
>
>
1
>
>
>
>
>
>
q 2 [ 1; 0]
>
<
q ( )= 0
>
>
>
>
>
q 0 2 [0; 1]
>
>
>
>
:1
Z

if

( ; 1) <

;

if

( ; 1) =

;

if

( ; 1) >

if

( ; 1) =

if

( ; 1) >

> ( ; 1);
;
;

1

q ( )d = 0:

0

If
coincides with the ‡at portion of one virtual value, then by the pooling property of
Myerson (1981), the optimal allocation rule must be constant over that interval, and the
level of the allocation is uniquely determined by the integral constraint. Finally, suppose
equals the value of ( ; q ( )) over more than one ‡at portion of the virtual values ( ; 1)
and ( ; 1). Without loss of generality, we can select an allocation q that assigns experiment
q = 0 or q 2 f 1; 1g to all types in one of the two intervals.
Proof of Proposition 8. (1.) If F ( ) + f ( ) and F ( ) + (
1) f ( ) are strictly increasing, then ironing is not required and it follows from the analysis in the text that the optimal
solution has q 2 f 1; 0; 1g for all .
(2.) If all types are located at one side from 1=2 then the integral constraint has no bite
since the allocation rule q ( ) can always be adjusted on the other side to satisfy it. The
solution on each side of 1=2 involves a cuto¤ type and q 2 f 1; 0g or q 2 f0; 1g ; both of
which result in ‡at pricing.
(3.) If types are symmetrically distributed, then the separately optimal menus for types
< 1=2 and > 1=2 are identical. Therefore, the union of the two solutions satis…es the
integral constraint, and hence solves the original problem.
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